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Abstract 
Conventional sacrificial moral dilemmas propose directly causing some harm to prevent greater 
harm. Theory suggests that accepting such actions (consistent with utilitarian philosophy) 
involves more reflective reasoning than rejecting such actions (consistent with deontological 
philosophy). However, past findings do not always replicate, confound different kinds of 
reflection, and employ conventional sacrificial dilemmas that treat utilitarian and deontological 
considerations as opposite. In two studies, we examined whether past findings would replicate 
when employing process dissociation to assess deontological and utilitarian inclinations 
independently. Findings suggested two categorically different impacts of reflection: measures of 
arithmetic reflection, such as the Cognitive Reflection Test, predicted only utilitarian, not 
deontological, response tendencies. However, measures of logical reflection, such as 
performance on logical syllogisms, positively predicted both utilitarian and deontological 
tendencies. These studies replicate some findings, clarify others, and reveal opportunity for 
additional nuance in dual process theorists’ claims about the link between reflection and 
dilemma judgments. 
Keywords: moral dilemmas; process dissociation; dual-process theory; cognitive reflection test; 
belief bias; moral psychology 
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Not All Who Ponder Count Costs: Arithmetic Reflection Predicts Utilitarian Inclinations, 
but Logical Reflection Predicts both Deontological and Utilitarian Inclinations 
 
Imagine a nurse working at your hospital became infected with a rare contagious virus. 
She is only a viral carrier, so she will recover, but the virus will spread, killing many others. The 
only way to stop the virus is to give her antiviral medication—but she is allergic to this 
medication and will die from its side effects. Is it appropriate to give her the medication to 
prevent the deadly virus from spreading, even though this will kill her? Imagine you took time to 
ponder your decision. According to the popular dual process theory, reflecting on such dilemmas 
involves calculating the difference between lives saved versus lives lost, thereby increasing the 
likelihood that reflective decision-makers accept performing harmful actions with net benefits 
(e.g., Greene et al., 2004). Yet, some theorists have cast doubt on this view of reflection (e.g., 
Baron, Scott, Fincher, & Metz, 2015), and other work suggests that reflection can sometimes 
increase harm-rejection responses (e.g., McPhetres, Conway, Hughes, & Zuckerman, 2018). One 
possibility for resolving these inconsistencies is to posit that different types of reflection have 
different impacts on dilemma decision-making, and that past work has remained largely 
insensitive to these differences. If so, then the impact of reflection on dilemma decisions may be 
more complex and multifaceted than previously believed.  
Past work on this issue has typically examined how responses on measures like the 
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT, Frederick 2005) predict sacrificial dilemma judgments. The 
CRT assesses cognitive reasoning via performance on math problems that lure test-takers toward 
intuitive but incorrect answers. People who score higher on the CRT are frequently more willing 
to cause some harm that mitigates overall harm (e.g., Baron et al., 2015; Byrd, 2019; Royzman, 
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Landy, & Leeman, 2014).1 Such findings have been described as support for the dual process 
claim that utilitarian judgments require overcoming unreflective harm aversion responses with 
mathematical comparisons of each outcome of the dilemma (e.g., Paxton, Unger, & Greene, 
2012). Conversely, Baron and colleagues (2015) argued against this model. They found that the 
link between CRT responses and utilitarian judgments was unreliable (see also Cova et al., 
2018), that the link between new CRT questions without lures and utilitarian judgments was 
about as reliable, and that valuing actively open-minded thinking also predicted utilitarian 
judgments. Hence, they concluded that the impact of the CRT on dilemma judgments is not 
explained by overcoming unreflective responses (e.g., responding reflectively on CRT items with 
lures) as well as it is explained by the extensiveness of reflection (e.g., actively open-minded 
thinking and CRT items without lures).  
Yet, analyses of conventional sacrificial dilemmas may yield correlations between 
reflection and dilemma responses that appear “labile” (Baron et al., 2015, p. 279), when in fact 
they are quite stable. Moreover, it may be that different measures of reflection have different 
relationships with dilemma decisions—relationships that may be obscured in analyses of 
conventional sacrificial dilemmas. Conventional sacrificial dilemmas treat deontological and 
utilitarian considerations as diametrically opposite. So conventional analyses cannot determine 
whether a given measure, such as the CRT, predicts utilitarian inclinations independently of 
deontological inclinations; moreover, such analyses remain insensitive to factors that predict 
                                                 
1 Note that utilitarian inclinations as assessed here correspond roughly to the ‘minimalist’ orientation described by 
Royzman, Landy, and Leeman (2014)—both reflect perceptions that acting to maximize outcomes in morally 
appropriate rather than mandatory. This difference reflects inconsistency regarding the ways researchers employ the 
meaning of the term ‘utilitarian judgments’ (see Conway et al., 2018).  
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increases in both inclinations, thereby cancelling out for conventional sacrificial dilemma 
judgments (e.g., Reynolds & Conway, 2018).  
To overcome these limitations and clarify previous findings, we employed both 
conventional analysis and process dissociation (PD), which can better distinguish deontological 
and utilitarian inclinations from other factors (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). We also assessed 
all measures of reflective thinking employed by Baron and colleagues (2015). The increased 
sensitivity afforded by PD allowed us to clarify the robustness of the relationship between 
reflection and dilemma responding. Moreover, PD allowed us to clarify how each measure of 
reflection relates to each dilemma response tendency. Two studies suggest that arithmetic 
reflection, as captured by measures like the CRT, primarily predicts utilitarian tendencies, but 
logical reflection, as captured by measures containing syllogisms, predicts both deontological 
and utilitarian tendencies.  
Moral Dilemmas 
Sacrificial dilemmas involve causing some harm to maximize overall outcomes, such as 
in the nurse dilemma described above or in the famous trolley problem where one can redirect a 
runaway trolley to kill one person to save five others. Although philosophers originally devised 
moral dilemmas to indirectly test how well their intuitive responses obey certain moral principles 
(e.g., Foot, 1967, 1995; Thomson, 1986), subsequent theorists have treated ordinary peoples’ 
decisions to accept or reject causing harm in sacrificial dilemmas as compatible with and 
possibly involving simpler versions of those moral principles (e.g., Greene et al., 2004; Conway, 
Goldstein-Greenwood, Polacek, & Greene, 2018a). Specifically, accepting harm that maximizes 
outcomes is said to align with utilitarianism, where the moral appropriateness of actions depends 
on their consequences—the goal is to increase overall wellbeing (Mill, 1861/1998; Norcross, 
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2006).2 Conversely, decisions to reject causing harm (even when doing so results in greater total 
harm) are said to align with deontology, where the moral appropriateness of actions hinges on 
their accordance with moral maxims, independent of consequences (Kant, 1785/1959; Alexander 
& Moore, 2016). Hence, theorists often treat dilemma responses as definitionally ‘deontological’ 
or ‘utilitarian’ even though decision-makers may not evince explicit or implicit commitment to 
such moral theories.3  
Although dilemmas were developed by philosophers, considerable empirical research 
examines the psychological mechanisms that underpin dilemma responses (see Greene, 2013). 
The most prominent model of psychological factors suggests that deontological judgments are 
driven primarily by negative emotional responses to causing harm, whereas utilitarian responses 
are driven primarily by cognitive reflection about consequences (Greene et al., 2001; Greene, 
2007, 2013; for updates see Cushman, 2013; Crockett, 2013). The original ‘hard’ version of this 
theory further stipulated that deontological judgments occur rapidly and intuitively, but evidence 
does not support this contention (e.g., Baron, Gürçay, Moore, & Starcke, 2012; Koop, 2013). 
Yet, there remains considerable support for the ‘softer’ dual process claim that deontological 
judgments involve relatively more affective processing, whereas utilitarian judgments involve 
relatively more cognitive deliberation (e.g., Bartels, 2008; Conway & Gawronski, 2013; 
                                                 
2 Utilitarian ethics involve both minimizing total harm and pursuing impartial concern for the greater good, but 
sacrificial dilemmas appear to reflect the former, not the latter (Conway et al., 2018). Some theorists argue that this 
is a limitation of sacrificial dilemmas (e.g., Kahane et al., 2015, 2018), but this argument assumes that the goal of 
dilemma research is to describe the psychology behind utilitarian philosophical ideals, when originally dilemma 
research was designed to examine the psychology behind a particular set of decisions that happen to definitely 
qualify as utilitarian, and were never intended to capture the entirety of utilitarian thinking (Greene, 2013; Conway 
et al., 2018a).  
3 Dilemma decisions may be descriptively consistent with a given philosophy, but this does not mean they were 
caused by general commitments to that philosophy. Instead, dilemma decisions could express a variety of 
motivations, some of which are plausibly related to the more elaborate views endorsed by philosophers and some of 
which are not. Hence, calling something a utilitarian decision does not imply that decision-maker generally endorses 
utilitarian ideals, but rather that the judgment is required by utilitarianism and likely involves simple cost-benefit or 
greater good thinking that resembles utilitarian reasoning (see Kahane et al., 2015, 2018; Conway et al., 2018a). 
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Gleichgerrcht & Young, 2013; Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Moore, 
Clark, & Kane, 2008; Patil & Silani, 2014; Patil et al., 2019).  
That said, the picture is undoubtedly more complex. Not all labs have replicated such 
effects (e.g., Gawronski, Conway, Friesdorf, Armstrong, & Hütter, 2017), some find links 
between deliberative processing and deontological response tendencies (e.g., Gamez-Djokic & 
Molden, 2016; Körner & Volk, 2014; McPhetres et al., 2018), and others demonstrate links 
between affective concerns and utilitarian response tendencies (e.g., Reynolds & Conway, 2018). 
Further, models focused on such basic processes ignore higher-order processes like strategic self-
presentation (Rom & Conway, 2018). However, the preponderance of evidence suggests that the 
dual-process model is not so much incorrect as merely incomplete. Although other processes 
play a role, ultimately considerable evidence supports the claim that deontological responses 
involve relatively more affective processing about harmful actions, whereas utilitarian responses 
appear to involve relatively more deliberative reasoning about outcomes (e.g., Bartels, 2008; 
Conway et al., 2018a). Thus, we anticipated that most measures of reflective thinking would 
predict utilitarian responses—yet, we also suspected that some measures of reflective thinking 
may predict deontological responses.  
Reflection and Dilemma Judgments  
Philosophers have long suggested that reflection is an important component of utilitarian 
judgment (e.g., Sidgwick, 1874/1962), and considerable evidence supports this view. For 
example, people who make utilitarian judgments tend to score high on measures of reflective (vs. 
intuitive or unreflective) thinking (Bartels, 2008), working memory capacity (Moore, Clarke, & 
Kane, 2008), deliberative approaches to morality (Fleishmann, Lammers, Conway, & Galinsky, 
2017), performance on the CRT (Baron et al., 2015; Byrd, 2019; Paxton, Bruni, & Greene, 
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2014), actively open-minded thinking (Baron et al., 2015), and demonstrate activation in brain 
regions associated with cognitive processing (Greene et al., 2004). Moreover, situational 
manipulations that facilitate deliberation increase utilitarian responding (Bartels, 2008; Paxton et 
al., 2012; cf. Cova et al., 2018), and situations that impair deliberation tend to reduce (Conway & 
Gawronski, 2013; Trémolière, De Neys, & Bonnefon, 2012) or slow utilitarian responding 
(Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008)—at least until the trade-off ratio 
becomes extreme (e.g., sacrifice 1 to save 5000, Trémolière & Bonnefon, 2014). Thus, a 
preponderance of evidence upholds the link between utilitarian responses and reflection. Indeed, 
forthcoming meta-analyses find positive correlations between measures of reflective reasoning 
and utilitarian judgments (Hannikainen & Cova, 2019; Reynolds, Byrd, & Conway, 2019).  
Yet, critics have also challenged the link between reflection and utilitarian dilemma 
judgments. Replications of Paxton and colleagues (2012) failed to obtain converging evidence 
that priming reflective thinking increased utilitarian judgments (Cova et al., 2018; Paxton, Bruni, 
& Greene, 2014), and Gawronski and colleagues (2017) failed to replicate the earlier finding 
from Conway and Gawronski (2013) that cognitive load reduces outcome-focused responding, 
albeit using a different set of dilemmas. More relevant to this paper’s primary interest, Baron and 
colleagues (2015) presented five studies assessing the links between measures of reflection, 
responses to moral dilemmas,4 and philosophical commitments.5 They found that CRT 
                                                 
4 Baron and colleagues assessed both ‘number’ dilemmas that entail administering harm to prevent greater total 
harm, and ‘rule’ dilemmas that pit a deontological against a utilitarian rule. Only number dilemmas correspond to 
the kinds of sacrificial dilemmas employed in the current work because not all rule dilemmas involve causing harm, 
and thus lay people may view them in a very different light (see Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009; Conway et 
al., 2018). Thus, we limit our claims to discussion of sacrificial dilemmas (i.e., ‘number’ dilemmas) only.  
5 Again, the psychological processes that drive dilemma judgments need not entail endorsement of the philosophical 
positions that dilemmas are said to accord with (Kahane et al., 2018; Conway et al., 2018). We focus here on the 
link between reflection and dilemma responses per se and remain agnostic about links between reflection and 
endorsement of any philosophy.  
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performance often, but somewhat inconsistently, predicted acceptance of harm on sacrificial 
dilemmas, concluding that the correlation between reflection and utilitarian dilemma judgments 
is “labile and not always found” (Baron et al., 2015, p. 279). Baron and colleagues also 
investigated the original ‘hard’ dual process claim that utilitarian responses require overcoming a 
rapid initial intuition to select the deontological response (see also Bago & De Neys, 2018). They 
argued that if this were the case then there ought to be higher correlations between utilitarian 
responding and variants of the CRT that contain ‘lures’—tempting but incorrect intuitive 
responses—than variants of the CRT without lures, as the former would better assess 
dispositions to overcome initial intuitions. Yet, they found that utilitarian responses correlated 
similarly with both of these CRT variants. They argued that such findings indicate that utilitarian 
judgments need not entail overcoming an initial intuitive response. Rather, utilitarian judgments 
correlate with CRT performance indirectly through shared variance with a third construct: 
actively open-minded thinking (AOT). AOT assesses two components: ambition to reason 
extensively and openness to change one’s mind (Stanovich & West, 1997; Baron, 1995). Baron 
and colleagues conclude that utilitarian responses are better explained by the former, 
extensiveness component of AOT than the latter, openness component of AOT, given their 
earlier conclusion that utilitarian judgments do not seem to involve changing initial responses.  
However, the conventional sacrificial dilemmas Baron and colleagues used to support 
this argument have a limitation: they measure the relative rather than the absolute strengths of 
competing considerations. Historically, many deontologically-minded philosophers considered 
both “bad results” or “disastrous consequences” and paradigmatically deontological principles in 
their moral reasoning (e.g., Kant, 1797/1991, p. 53; Ross, 1930/2003, p. 18; see also Alexander 
& Moore, 2016; Johnson, 2019a, 2019b). Alas, conventional sacrificial dilemmas measure only 
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the relative difference between these consequential and deontological considerations rather than 
the absolute contribution of each consideration (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). So when 
something covaries with both deontological and utilitarian considerations in the same direction 
and to the same degree, then the relative difference is zero, and analysis of the conventional 
sacrificial dilemmas does not detect the effect, thereby missing or distorting results that other 
techniques can detect (e.g., Reynolds & Conway, 2018; Conway et al., 2018a, 2018b). In the 
current work, we use these more sensitive techniques to dissociate absolute contributions of 
competing moral considerations and their relationship with measures of reflection, including 
CRT and AOT.  
Arithmetic measures of reflection. One widely used arithmetic measure of reflection is 
the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005). The original CRT includes three rudimentary 
math questions that are designed to lure participants into a particular, incorrect answer. For 
example, one question is as follows. “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1 more 
than the ball. How much does the ball cost?” Most participants were lured to responding “10 
cents.” Yet, that response is incorrect: it satisfies the prompt’s first condition, but not the 
prompt’s second condition. Frederick labeled such lured incorrect responses as ‘intuitive,’ but 
subsequent work has called into question whether this label is appropriate, given that lured 
responses do not correlate with other measures of intuition (Pennycook, Cheyne, & Koehler, 
2015). Hence, we employ the term reflective to describe a correct response to a CRT question, 
and lured to describe the lured, incorrect response to a CRT question, which is importantly 
distinct from other possible incorrect responses to a CRT question.6  
                                                 
6 Since the CRT contains only three items and it has been accepted as a valid measure of reflection, it is among the 
most commonly used measures of its kind. However, some are worried that as more participants are exposed to the 
CRT, they will learn to pre-empt or even overcome its lures (Haigh, 2016). So researchers have responded by 
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Although Frederick (2005) designed the CRT as a measure of general reflective ability, 
he expressed some concern that it is confounded with numeracy. Numeracy, short for numerical 
literacy, refers to the ability to comprehend and process mathematical information (Reyna, 
Nelson, Han, & Dieckmann, 2009). Because the CRT involves comprehending and processing 
mathematical information, some researchers have worried that the CRT is just another numeracy 
test (Campitelli & Labollita, 2010). However, subsequent work indicates that while CRT 
performance does correlate with numeracy, the CRT is not reducible to a numeracy test (Liberali, 
Reyna, Furlan, Stein, & Pardo, 2012; Patel, 2017; Primi, Morsanyi, Chiesi, Donati, & Hamilton, 
2016)—it also measures the inhibition of default responses (e.g., Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014), 
miserly reasoning (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011), and actively open-minded thinking 
(Szaszi, Szollosi, Palfi, & Aczel, 2017).  
One might wonder how the numeracy portion of CRT scores can explain correlations 
between CRT performance and utilitarian judgments. People higher in numeracy tend to be more 
influenced by mathematical information in their environment (Reyna et al., 2009) and tend to 
direct donations where they benefit the greatest proportion of a population (Kleber, Dickert 
Peters, & Florack, 2013). Many theorists have argued that utilitarian judgments involve some 
degree of mathematical calculus, as they involve weighing different numbers of lives and 
selecting the highest values (e.g., Greene et al., 2004). Moreover, past research finds links 
between utilitarian dilemma judgments and deliberation (e.g., Bartels, 2008; Moore, Clark, & 
                                                 
creating new, and therefore less familiar, versions of the CRT (e.g., Ackerman 2014; Finucane & Gullion 2010; 
Baron et al 2015; Oldrati, Patricelli, Colombo, & Antonietti, 2016; Primi, Morsanyi, Chiesei, Donati, & Hamilton 
2016; Schtulman & McCallum, 2014; Stieger & Reips, 2016; Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016; Toplak, West, & 
Stanovich, 2014; Trémolière, De Neys, & Bonnefon 2014). More recent research has found that the concern about 
familiarity might have been overstated: CRT performance is robust, even after repeated exposures (Białek & 
Pennycook, 2017; Meyer, Zhou, & Frederick, 2018; Stagnaro, Pennycook, & Rand, 2018; Welsh & Begg, 2017). 
Nonetheless, in our studies, we used all arithmetic measures of reflection employed by Baron and colleagues (2015), 
including the original 3-item CRT.  
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Kane, 2008; Greene et al., 2004). More recent work by Patil and colleagues (2019) found that 
more calculation-heavy model-based reasoning correlated with utilitarian and not the 
deontological response patterns. Taken together, this work suggests that arithmetic measures of 
reflection, such as the CRT, will correlate with utilitarian, but not deontological, response 
tendencies when these tendencies are assessed independently (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). 
Logical measures of reflection. Baron and colleagues (2015) found that utilitarian 
judgments correlated with not only arithmetic CRT variants, but also non-arithmetic measures of 
reflection. These measures assess participants’ logical reasoning by asking participants if a 
syllogism is logically valid—i.e., if a set of premises support a conclusion. Some logical 
measures of reflection also measure belief bias: the tendency to evaluate a syllogism according to 
the believability of its conclusion instead of the logical validity of the syllogism (Evans, Barston, 
& Pollard, 1983; Janis & Frick, 1943; Oakhill & Johnson-Laird, 1985; Markovits & Nantel, 
1989). Like the CRT, tests of belief bias lure participants into giving a particular incorrect 
response. A typical belief bias item presents two premises and asks participants about what 
logically follows from those premises. Some belief bias questions ask if believable conclusions 
follow from the premises—e.g., “If these two statements are true, can we conclude that Bill 
Gates is rich?”—but other belief bias questions ask if unbelievable conclusions follow from 
premises—e.g., “If these two statements are true, can we conclude that boats have wheels?” 
Moreover, some belief bias syllogisms present answers that are logically valid, whereas other 
belief bias syllogisms are logically fallacious. As a result, researchers can examine whether 
participants correctly indicate which syllogisms are logically valid versus invalid, both in cases 
where conclusions seem intuitively plausible and in cases where they do not. Thus, people who 
score high in logical reflection are adept at evaluating logical validity, whether or not the 
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statements involved seem intuitively correct, an ability that requires deliberative processing 
(Oakhill & Johnson-Laird, 1985; Markovits & Nantel, 1989).  
Given the findings described above linking deliberative processing to utilitarian 
responding (e.g., Bartels, 2008; Patil et al., 2019), including (most notably) Baron and 
colleagues’ (2015) findings, one might expect that performance on measures of logical reflection 
will correlate with utilitarian but not deontological response tendencies when these are measured 
independently (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). However, logical reflection may have a different 
relationship with dilemma judgments than arithmetic reflection does. Arithmetic and logical 
reflection appear to track somewhat different constructs: Research suggests that people who 
overcome lured responses on measures of logical reflection take longer to answer the relevant 
questions than people who fall for the lures; however, people who overcome lured responses on 
the CRT take no longer than people who fall for the lures (Stupple, Ball, Evans, & Kamal-Smith, 
2011; Stupple, Ball, & Ellis, 2013).  
Consider also that deontological theorists like Kant (1797/1991) envisioned deontological 
judgments arising from logical reflection about principles, reasons, and norms (Bennis, Medin, & 
Bartels, 2010). In line with Kant’s expectation, recent work has found that cognitive deliberation 
can contribute to deontological response tendencies (Gamez-Djokic & Molden, 2016; Körner & 
Volk, 2014; McPhetres, et al., 2018). Further, consider that dilemmas are designed to create 
conflict by posing two unappealing options and that conflict detection can trigger reflection 
(Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015). In line with this, recent work suggests that increasing 
conflict by inducing people to distrust their initial dilemma responses increases both 
deontological and utilitarian response tendencies, and this effect is mediated through increased 
ambivalence between answers (Conway et al., 2018b). Moreover, people who care deeply about 
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harm—and, presumably, think more carefully about sacrificial dilemmas—score higher on both 
deontological and utilitarian inclinations (Reynolds & Conway, 2018; Conway et al., 2018a); as 
do people who care about being moral (Conway & Gawronksi, 2013). Conversely, reducing 
ability to understand and engage with dilemmas reduces both deontological and utilitarian 
response tendencies (Muda, Niszczota, Białek, & Conway, 2017; Hayakawa, et al., 2017). 
Therefore, we expected that greater logical reflection would predict not only utilitarian response 
tendencies, but also deontological response tendencies. Thus, we expected that arithmetic 
reflection would have a different impact on dilemma judgments than logical reflection—but that 
this difference would be more detectable with process dissociation than with only conventional 
sacrificial dilemmas.  
Process Dissociation  
Existing work assessing the link between reflection and moral dilemma judgments relies 
on conventional sacrificial dilemmas, which confound motivations for one dilemma response 
with rejection of competing motivations for the other dilemma response. Alternatively, we 
employ process dissociation (PD) to assess absolute parameters for utilitarian and deontological 
response tendencies. PD is a content agnostic procedure designed to disentangle the impact of 
multiple influences jointly contributing to an outcome (Jacoby, 1991) and has been fruitfully 
deployed in much research (Payne & Bishara 2009), including moral dilemmas (Conway & 
Gawronski 2013). Unlike conventional sacrificial dilemmas, which attempt to measure only 
relative contributions of utilitarian and deontological considerations, PD dilemma analysis 
attempts to assess the absolute contribution of utilitarian considerations independently of the 
contribution of deontological and other considerations.  
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Using PD to assess moral dilemma judgments involves assessing responses to both 
congruent and incongruent dilemmas. Incongruent dilemmas correspond to conventional 
sacrificial dilemmas. Rejecting harmful action in incongruent dilemmas is said to align with 
paradigmatically deontological ethics, where actions are evaluated according to categorical 
moral norms (e.g., Kant, 1797/1991, see Alexander & Moore, 2016). Conversely, accepting 
harmful action in incongruent dilemmas (thus mitigating overall harm) is said to align with 
paradigmatically utilitarian ethics where the morality of actions are determined by their 
consequences (e.g., Mill, 1861/1998, see Alexander & Moore, 2016). Congruent dilemmas are 
worded similarly, and propose causing the exact same harm, but the outcome of that harm no 
longer maximizes overall wellbeing. Indeed, rejecting harmful action in congruent dilemmas also 
leads to the overall optimal outcome. So rejecting harmful action in congruent dilemmas is said 
to align with both deontological and utilitarian ethics, whereas accepting harmful action in 
congruent dilemmas not only violates norms about directly causing harm but also makes the 
world worse and is therefore said to be anathema to both deontological and utilitarian ethical 
considerations.  
PD computes independent utilitarian and deontological parameters by distinguishing 
multiple response patterns across both congruent and incongruent dilemmas (Figure 1). Although 
named ‘deontological’ and ‘utilitarian,’ consistent with the historical terminology in the field, we 
reiterate that these parameters do not represent explicit commitment to these philosophical 
positions (Kahane et al., 2015, 2018; Conway et al., 2018a); instead they refer to two response 
patterns: a pattern of not causing harm regardless of consequences (the deontology parameter), 
and a pattern of minimizing overall harm even when that requires directly causing some harm 
(the utilitarian parameter). We combined participant responses to incongruent and congruent 
REFLECTION AND DILEMMA JUDGMENT  15 
dilemmas and employed the six formulae from Conway and Gawronski (2013), to algebraically 
compute a utilitarian and deontological parameter score for each participant (see Appendix).  
 
 
Figure 1. Processing tree illustrating how the Utilitarian (U) and Deontological (D) parameters 
are derived from responses to congruent and incongruent moral dilemmas using process 
dissociation.  
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A growing body of work corroborates the utility of process dissociation for enhancing 
insight into the psychology of dilemma judgments. PD both allows for clarifying ambiguous 
findings and for increased sensitivity to detect effects that remain invisible to conventional 
sacrificial dilemma analyses. By assessing utilitarian and deontological response tendencies 
independently, researchers can disambiguate whether third factors impact one or the other 
process. For instance, multiple researchers have noted gender differences in dilemma responses 
and interpreted them as men scoring higher in utilitarian responses (e.g., Fumagalli et al., 2010; 
Arutyunova, Alexandrov, & Hauser, 2016), but process dissociation reveals that in fact men and 
women score similarly in terms of utilitarian tendencies; in fact, most of the variance in gender 
differences reflects higher deontological response tendencies among women than men 
(Armstrong, Friesdorf, & Conway, 2018; Friesdorf, Conway, & Gawronski, 2015). Likewise, 
some conventional sacrificial dilemma analyses have suggested that utilitarian responses merely 
express psychopathy, egoism, and other antisocial personality traits (e.g., Bartels & Pizarro, 
2011; Kahane et al., 2015). However, PD includes congruent dilemmas and then excludes the 
patently non-deontological and non-utilitarian responses of accepting harm on these congruent 
dilemmas from both the utilitarian and deontological parameters (Figure 1). This more careful 
PD analysis finds that psychopathy, egoism, and antisociality either do not correlate with or anti-
correlate with both the deontological and utilitarian parameters (Conway et al., 2018a). In other 
words, conventional sacrificial dilemmas confound psychopathic, egoistic, and antisocial 
responses with more pro-social, utilitarian responses in ways that PD dilemma analyses do not. 
Similarly, PD can clarify the link between reflection and moral dilemma responses. One 
might ask why reflection only sometimes correlates with utilitarian responses (Baron et al., 
2015). It might be that reflection, like need for cognition, typically correlates with only the 
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utilitarian response pattern (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). Or it might be that reflection, like 
emotion regulation, empathic concern, and religiosity, correlates not with the utilitarian response 
pattern, but the deontological response pattern (Ibid.; Conway et al., 2018a; Lee & Gino, 2015; 
Park, Kappes, Rho, & Van Bavel, 2016). Or, it could be that reflection correlates positively with 
both deontological and utilitarian response patterns, but the correlation with the utilitarian pattern 
is sometimes stronger. Conventional sacrificial dilemma analysis cannot distinguish these 
possibilities, but PD dilemma analysis can.  
More importantly, PD has proven useful for detecting effects in the case of suppression, 
when a single variable has multiple competing impacts that largely cancel out. For example, 
Miller and colleagues (2014) found that outcome aversion—aversion to witnessing others suffer 
in agony—failed to predict conventional sacrificial dilemma responses. Reynolds and Conway 
(2018) replicated this finding using conventional sacrificial dilemmas, but their PD analysis 
revealed that outcome aversion positively predicted both the deontology and utilitarian 
parameters—these dual positive effects cancelled out in conventional sacrificial dilemmas that 
treat deontological and utilitarian responses as opposites.  
Similar suppression effects on moral dilemma judgments have been demonstrated for 
moral identity internalization (e.g., Conway & Gawronski, 2013), power (Fleishmann et al., 
2017), self-control (Maranges et al., 2018), language processing (Hayakawa et al., 2017), moral 
conviction about harm (Conway et al., 2018a), and distrust mindsets (Conway et al., 2018b). 
Therefore, suppression is far from rare. Note that both partial and complete suppression are 
possible. Complete suppression occurs when the size of two competing effects are similar, so 
they cancel out completely; partial suppression occurs when one effect is substantially larger 
than the other, leading to a small, unreliable effect on conventional sacrificial dilemma 
REFLECTION AND DILEMMA JUDGMENT  18 
responses. Due to statistical fluctuation, both partial and complete suppression may occur for the 
same sets of variables across multiple datasets (e.g., Reynolds and Conway, 2018), and is 
therefore particularly likely in cases where a theoretically meaningful effect appears 
intermittently across multiple datasets (e.g., Miller et al., 2014). Indeed, Baron and colleagues 
(2015) appear to face this exact same situation: reflection only predicted dilemma judgments 
intermittently. Thus, in the current work, we examined whether a PD analysis may reveal 
evidence of suppression regarding the influence of cognitive reflection on dilemma judgments. 
As noted above, we anticipated correlations with logical reflection would be suppressed in 
conventional sacrificial dilemmas, whereas we anticipated that arithmetic reflection would 
predict only the utilitarian parameter. In other words, by illuminating potential suppression 
effects, PD offered the opportunity to distinguish the link between each type of reflection and 
moral judgments. 
The Current Research 
Given that PD has demonstrated increased sensitivity to detect effects invisible to 
conventional sacrificial dilemma analyses, we employed PD to clarify the relationships between 
dilemma responding and cognitive reflection. Building on the work of Baron and colleagues 
(2015), we assessed all the measures of reflection they employed, but instead of measuring 
dilemma responses using only conventional sacrificial dilemmas, we employed PD dilemma 
analysis.7 For conventional sacrificial dilemmas, we expected to largely replicate the findings of 
Baron and colleagues (2015). However, armed with PD’s greater clarity, we expected arithmetic 
                                                 
7 Baron and colleagues also measured dilemma judgment response-times. Given that research shows only a weak 
correlation between response-times and other measures of reflection (Stupple, Pitchford, Ball, Hunt, & Steel, 2017) 
and no significant difference in response-times between CRT takers whose first response is correct and CRT takers 
whose first response is incorrect (Szaszi, Szollosi, Palfi, & Aczel 2017), we did not assess reaction times in the 
current work.  
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reflection to predict utilitarian but not deontological response tendencies and logical reflection to 
predict both utilitarian but not deontological response tendencies. In Study 1 we included all of 
the arithmetic and logical measures of reflection employed by Baron and colleagues (2015) and 
analyzed their relationship with both conventional sacrificial dilemma responses and PD 
dilemma response tendencies. In Study 2, we examined whether the effects in Study 1 would 
replicate and added measures of actively open-minded thinking and general numerical ability. 
Finally, we examined whether performance on a variety of reflection tasks mediate the impact of 
CRT performance on conventional sacrificial dilemma responses and on the PD parameters. For 
all studies, we report all manipulations, measures, exclusions, and we followed APA ethical 
guidelines. All data files and SPSS analysis syntax are available from the Open Science 
Framework: https://osf.io/y4mdw/ 
Study 1 
Method 
Participants. To obtain 99% power to detect a correlation of r = .3, GPower indicated 
that we would need 195 participants (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). We chose r = .3 
because it is similar to the typical correlation between reflection and dilemma decisions in Baron 
and colleagues (2015). We oversampled, recruiting 282 American participants via a single run of 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk for $2.00 per participant. We decided a priori to exclude all 
participants who failed an instructional manipulation check (n = 6) (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & 
Davidenko, 2009) or who didn’t complete all moral dilemmas (n = 0), leaving a final sample of 
276 (143 male, 133 female, Mage = 35.25, SD = 10.50, 224 identified as White, 18 as Black, 12 as 
Hispanic or Latino, 4 as Pacific Islander, 2 as American Indian or Native American, and 16 as 
other ethnicity).  
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Procedure and materials. Participants completed all measures online, one item per 
page. Descriptive statistics such as Cronbach’s alpha for all measures and zero order correlations 
between all measures are reported in Table 1 to facilitate comparisons with existing work as well 
as future meta-analyses. We do not interpret most of these correlations in the present work. 
Cognitive reflection test. Participants completed all CRT items employed by Baron and 
colleagues (2015), some of which they developed themselves, and some of which they adapted 
from prior research (e.g., Finucane & Gullion, 2010).8 These included the original CRT 
questions, new CRT questions with lures, and new CRT questions without lures.  
Original CRT items. First, participants responded to the original, 3-item, Cognitive 
Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005). This includes the item regarding bats and balls presented 
above, as well as an item about widgets, and one about lily pads. Participants typed responses 
into a blank text box.9 We summed each participants’ correct responses and lured responses 
independent of other incorrect responses.  
New CRT with lures. Participants responded to three alternate CRT questions with lures, 
such as “If it takes 2 nurses 2 minutes to measure the blood pressure of 2 patients, how long 
would it take 200 nurses to measure the blood pressure of 200 patients?” We again summed all 
correct responses and all lured responses independent of other incorrect responses.  
New CRT without lures. Participants also completed six more CRT questions without 
lures, such as, “If it takes 1 machine 10 min to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 10 
machines to make 600 widgets?” Note that lured questions are designed to encourage an 
                                                 
8 Baron and colleagues measured various batches of these items across different studies, but we assessed them all in 
each study.  
9 Although recent work suggests the CRT remains similarly reliable whether researchers employ open-ended or 
multiple format (Sirota & Juanchich, 2018).  
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immediate, unreflective response (e.g., two nurses and two minutes and two patients presents a 
misleading pattern), whereas CRT questions without lures are not designed to suggest an 
immediate, unreflective response. However, Baron and colleagues (2015) found similar results 
for CRT items regardless of the presence or absence of lures.  
Belief Bias. Participants also responded to all belief bias questions employed by Baron 
and colleagues (2015), some of which were adapted from prior research (e.g., Markovits & 
Nantel 1989). These included the original belief bias questions, consistent belief bias questions, 
and no-lure belief bias questions. 
Original belief bias. Participants completed belief bias questions like the original belief 
bias questions in which the logical validity of the syllogism and the believability of its 
conclusion are incongruent, thus luring participants into evaluating syllogisms in terms of 
believability rather than logical validity. An example of an original belief bias item with this 
structure is this: “All flowers have petals. Roses have petals. If these two statements are true, can 
we conclude from them that roses are flowers?” (see Markovits & Nantel 1989). Participants’ 
correct responses were summed.  
Consistent belief bias. Participants also evaluated three more syllogisms in which the 
validity of the argument and the believability of its conclusion are congruent, such as the 
following: “All business owners are rich. Bill Gates is a business owner. If these two statements 
are true, can we conclude from them that Bill Gates is rich?” Almost every participant reported 
the correct answer, presumably because the validity of the argument is consistent with the 
believability of its conclusion, meaning that the lured response is the same as the so-called 
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reflective response. However, this means that variance was low for consistent belief bias items, 
making the reliability of the summed correct responses low.10  
No-lure belief bias. Participants completed four more belief bias syllogisms, this time 
with arguments containing novel words like ‘loolabay’, ‘wuzzies’, ‘shidos’, ‘reltas’ — so that 
participants would not be lured into evaluating syllogisms according to the believability of their 
conclusions, given that participants do not have prior beliefs about the novel words. One no-lure 
belief bias question is as follows: “All laloobays are rich. Sandy is a laloobay. If these two 
statements are true, can we conclude from them that Sandy is rich?” Participants’ correct 
responses on no-lure belief bias questions were summed. 
Other syllogisms. Then participants assessed three more syllogisms to test for general 
logical competence with items such as this: “In a box, some red things are square, and some 
square things are large. What can we conclude? (a) Some red things are large. (b) All red things 
are large. (c) We can’t conclude anything about red things and large things” (Johnson-Laird & 
Bara, 1984). Participants’ correct responses on the other syllogisms were summed. 
Verbal reasoning items. Participants then completed 3 verbal reasoning items. These 
items come from Toplak & Stanovich (2002), Böckenholt (2012), Krizo (2012),  and Baron’s 
personal correspondence with Edward Royzman, but can also be found in more recent work such 
as Thomson & Oppenheimer (2016) and Sirota and colleagues (2018). One example of these 
items is as follows, “Ann’s father has a total of five daughters: Lala, Lele, Lili, Lolo, and ____. 
                                                 
10 In some cases, the Cronbach’s alpha for measures was quite low, but this is to be expected because a) these 
measures only employed few items, b) there is limited variance in responses, c) there is often no systematic reason 
to select a particular incorrect response (i.e., there is no lure, or the lure is congruent with the correct response). 
Moreover, we note that that we obtained a similar pattern of correlations between third variables and measures with 
both high and low alphas, suggesting that low alphas do not impair the ability to interpret these findings. Finally, 
low alphas make it more rather than less difficult to obtain significant correlations, and therefore the significant 
correlations we find should be considered more robust than less conservative alphas would suggest. 
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What is the name of the fifth daughter?” Correct responses on these verbal reasoning items were 
summed. 
Process dissociation dilemma battery. Participants then responded to 10 moral dilemmas, 
each with two versions, in a fixed random order (see Conway & Gawronski, 2013; full text 
available at osf.io/nm7hy). Each dilemma described a harmful action that would achieve a 
particular outcome. Incongruent dilemmas correspond to conventional, high-conflict moral 
dilemmas (Koenigs et al., 2007), as causing some harm mitigates overall harm (for example, 
killing a baby will save many lives). Congruent dilemmas are worded identically to each 
incongruent dilemma, except that causing some harm does not mitigate overall harm (e.g., killing 
a baby will save others from hard labor). Participants considering harmful actions in each 
dilemma selected either yes, this harm is appropriate or no, this harm is not appropriate (Greene 
et al., 2001).  
We totaled the number of times participants accepted causing some harm that mitigates 
overall harm on incongruent dilemmas as a relative measure of moral judgments: higher scores 
reflect more utilitarian than deontological responses, whereas lower scores reflect more 
deontological than utilitarian responses. This corresponds to the conventional dilemma analysis. 
Then we computed the utilitarian and deontological process dissociation parameters using 
participant response patterns across both incongruent and congruent dilemmas (see Figure 1 and 
Appendix).  
Empathic concern. Finally, participants responded to the seven Empathic Concern items 
of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis 1980, 1983) on a 5-point scale ranging from Does 
not describe me well to Describes me very well. 
Results and Discussion 
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Correlational analysis. First, we computed correlations between all measures in the 
study (see Table 1). This analysis revealed that, consistent with past work (Conway & 
Gawronski, 2013), harm acceptance on conventional sacrificial dilemmas correlated positively 
with the utilitarian PD parameter and negatively with the deontological PD parameter, but the 
PD parameters themselves were not significantly correlated (r = .08, p = .21). Common gender 
effects replicated: women scored substantially higher on the deontological PD parameter, 
whereas gender differences were negligible on the utilitarian PD parameter (e.g., Friesdorf et al., 
2015). We also replicated previous findings showing that empathic concern correlated with the 
deontological but not utilitarian parameter (e.g., Conway & Gawronski, 2013).  
Moreover, measures of arithmetic and logical reflection (including lured responses) 
correlated as expected: performance on all variants of the CRT correlated with all measures of 
logical reflection (e.g., belief bias and other syllogism items). Likewise, lured incorrect 
responses on the CRT correlated negatively with all measures of logical reflection. These 
patterns suggest that all measures of reflection share some common variance (i.e., all assess 
some form of reflection), even though they demonstrate distinct patterns of correlations with 
dilemma responses.11 
Moreover, consistent with Baron and colleagues’ findings (2015), all variants of the CRT 
correlated positively with one another, whether the items were novel or not, and whether or not 
they included lures. Moreover, all showed similar patterns of relationships with other variables. 
Thus, all measures of the CRT seem to share common variance. However, unlike Baron and 
                                                 
11 We further investigated how different measures of reflection might measure different components of reflection by 
conducting a factor analysis (see Table S1 in supplement). Although results partially confirmed our expectation of a 
two-factor solution corresponding to arithmetic and logical reasoning, they also revealed a third factor that may 
partially reflect lured responding. Moreover, we obtained a slightly different pattern from a parallel factor analysis 
in Study 2. Therefore, we interpret these results with caution. 
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colleagues’ findings, we found that the correlations between CRT items with lures were often 
(but not always) significantly larger than correlations between CRT items with lures and CRT 
items without lures. For example, correct responses on the original CRT correlated higher with 
correct responses on the new CRT (with lures), r = .80, than with correct responses on the new 
CRT without lures, r = .44, z = 10.22, p < .001, controlling for the fact that the new CRT with 
and without lures themselves correlated r = .62. Thus, the presence versus absence of lures did 
not influence how well CRT items correlated with other measures but did influence how well 
CRT items cohered as a single construct—partially corroborating albeit somewhat diverging 
from Baron and colleagues’ results.  
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Table 1. Correlations between Harm Acceptance on Incongruent and Congruent Dilemmas, the Utilitarian and Deontological Process Dissociation 
Parameters, Cognitive Reflection Test, Belief Bias, Syllogisms, Verbal reasoning items, Gender, and Age in Study 1 (N = 276). 
 α 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
1. Harm Acceptance on 
Incongruent Dilemmas 
                 
2. Harm Acceptance on 
Congruent Dilemmas 
- .46**                
3. Utilitarian PD 
Parameter 
- .57*** -.47***               
4. Deontological PD 
parameter  
- -.74*** -.88*** .08              
5. Original CRT, 
Correct 
.80 .17** -.13* .29*** .06             
6. Original CRT, Lured  .77 -.12 .11 -.22*** -.06 -.92**            
7. New CRT, Correct .73 .21*** -.17** .37*** .07 .80** -.72***           
8. New CRT, Lured  .62 -.14* .11 -.25*** -.04 -.74** .77*** -.79***          
9. New No-Lure CRT, 
Correct 
.80 .14* -.24*** .36*** .14* .44** -.39*** .62*** -.42***         
10. Original Belief Bias .82 .05 -.21*** .25*** .16** .44** -.42*** .50*** -.40*** .52***        
11. No-Lure Belief Bias  .49 .08 -.29*** .35*** .19** .25** -.16** .41*** -.21*** .45*** .35***       
12. Consistent Belief 
Bias  
.06 .07 -.26*** .30** .15* .22** -.18** .36*** -.20** .32*** .19** .53***      
13. Other Syllogisms .72 .08 -.18* .25*** .13* .36** -.32** .37*** -.24*** .45*** .45*** .36*** .22***     
14. Verbal Reasoning 
Items 
.19 .10 -.09 .18** .02 .41*** -.41*** .38*** -.34*** .23*** .16** .14* .24*** .08    
15. Empathic Concern .89 -.05 -.18** .12 .16** -.01 .01 .04 -.04 -.06 .01 .12 .14* -.01 -.03   
16. Gender (m=1, f=2) - -.17** -.13* -.05 .16**  -.09 -.11 -.15* .10 -.18** -.18** -.04 .07 -.13* .04 .24***  
16. Age - -.09 -.28***  .17** .27*** .12* -.09 .09 -.06 .12* .12* .16** .13* .20** .05 .20** .16** 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Conventional analysis. Conventional sacrificial dilemma analyses replicated previous 
work (e.g., Baron et al., 2015; Byrd, 2019; Paxton, Ungar, & Greene, 2012; Royzman, Landy, & 
Leeman, 2014): all measures of arithmetic reflection—namely, CRT performance—correlated 
positively with conventional sacrificial dilemma judgments where higher scores predict harm 
acceptance and lower scores predict harm rejection. This pattern emerged for correct 
performance on all variants of the CRT, whether they employed the original wording or novel 
wording, and whether they employed lures or not. Moreover, all lured CRT responses correlated 
negatively with harm acceptance on incongruent dilemmas (note that lured responses are not the 
direct opposite of correct responses, as only one particular incorrect response per item is the 
lured response).  
Importantly, none of the non-arithmetic measures of reflection correlated significantly 
with conventional sacrificial dilemma responses: neither belief bias, nor other syllogisms, nor 
verbal reasoning items. This null pattern held for all variants of belief bias items, including 
original versions in which prior beliefs lure participants toward responses that conflict with logic, 
versions without such lures, and versions where prior beliefs lure participants toward responses 
that are consistent with logic. Thus, interpretations based only on conventional incongruent 
dilemmas would suggest that arithmetic, but not logical reflection predicts dilemma responding, 
and that arithmetic reflection predicts only utilitarian judgment. However, recall that PD is more 
sensitive than conventional analyses in cases of suppression where a single predictor has 
multiple competing influences that cancel out. Thus, we conducted a PD analysis to test for the 
possibility that correlations between dilemma judgments and logical reflection were suppressed 
in the conventional analysis.  
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Process dissociation analysis. As anticipated, PD both clarified the findings in 
conventional sacrificial dilemma analyses and revealed evidence of suppression effects invisible 
to such conventional analyses. All measures of arithmetic reflection and responses to 
conventional sacrificial dilemmas loaded on the utilitarian parameter, .22 < rs < .37, but not the 
deontological parameter, -.06 < rs < .07, except in one case: Correct responses on new CRT 
items without lures correlated positively with the deontology parameter, though it also correlated 
positively with the utilitarian parameter, and this effect was stronger, Z = 2.84, p = 004. Thus, 
overall, arithmetic reflection was primarily associated with increased outcome-maximizing 
responses, but rarely with harm-rejecting responses, in line with dual process theory’s 
predictions (Greene, 2015). Thus, PD clarified which parameter is impacted by effects detected 
via conventional methods, similar to past work (e.g., Friesdorf et al., 2015; Conway et al., 
2018a).  
Although PD corroborated and clarified conventional sacrificial dilemma analyses for 
arithmetic reflection, it revealed a very different picture of logical reflection than such 
conventional analyses. We found no significant correlations between measures of logical 
reflection and conventional incongruent dilemma responses. However, logical reflection anti-
correlated with harm accepting responses on congruent dilemmas—responses that are 
inconsistent with deontological and utilitarian considerations. So PD revealed that these effects 
are composed of correlations that suppress one another in conventional incongruent dilemmas: 
performance on all belief bias items and other syllogism items positively correlated with both the 
utilitarian and deontological PD parameters. In other words, people who engage in logical 
reflection focus not only on improving outcomes—in line with the dual process model—but on 
rejecting opportunities to cause harm, especially when causing harm does not improve outcomes.  
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Although this later finding does not support the dual process model, which posits that 
deontological responses are driven by emotion rather than reflection, this finding aligns with 
other recent work documenting the influence of cognitive deliberation on harm-rejecting 
(deontological) dilemma responding (Gawronski et al., 2017; McPhetres et al., 2018; Gamez-
Djokic & Molden, 2017; Körner & Volk, 2014; Białek & De Neys, 2017). Moreover, this finding 
aligns with classic views of deontological reflection about moral principles (e.g., Alexander & 
Moore, 2016; Kant, 1797/1991). However, it should be noted that this finding does not rule out 
the possibility that such logical reflection is initially motivated by affective reactions to harm; 
other work confirms the role of such emotional reactions (e.g., Reynolds & Conway, 2018; 
Szekely, Opre, & Miu, 2015). Consistent with this argument and past work, the deontology 
parameter also correlated with empathic concern (e.g., Conway & Gawronksi, 2013).  
These findings indicate that both logical reflection and concern about harm increase 
deontological responses, and that different kinds of reflection can have different relationships 
with dilemma responding. To gauge confidence in this interpretation, we attempted to replicate 
these findings with a new sample in Study 2. Moreover, in Study 2 we added a measure of 
actively open-minded thinking (AOT) to examine whether this variable demonstrates the same 
pattern as arithmetic reflection, as argued by Baron and colleagues (2015), or whether it 
demonstrates the same pattern as logical reflection. We also added a validated measure of 
numeracy—the Berlin Numeracy Test—to better understand its relationship with reflection and 
dilemma judgments. Finally, we examined whether various measures of reflection would 
mediate the impact of arithmetic reflection on conventional sacrificial dilemma responses and on 
the PD parameters. 
Study 2 
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Study 2 examined whether the findings of Study 1 would replicate with a new sample and 
added measures of numeracy (the Berlin Numeracy Test) and actively open-minded thinking 
(AOT). Baron and colleagues (2015) argued that AOT explained the relationship between CRT 
performance and harm acceptance on conventional sacrificial dilemmas. To examine this 
possibility, we examined whether AOT would mediate the effect of CRT performance on 
conventional sacrificial dilemmas, alongside other possible mediators, including numeracy, 
performance on the belief bias questions, other syllogism items, and verbal reflection items. 
Moreover, we conducted the same mediation analyses on the deontology and utilitarian PD 
parameters to assess whether some mediators carry variance from CRT performance to both PD 
dilemma parameters—effects that sometimes suppress one another in conventional sacrificial 
dilemmas (e.g., see Conway et al., 2018a).  
Method 
Participants. To obtain 99% power to detect a correlation of r = .3, GPower again 
indicated that would we need 195 participants (Faul et al, 2007). We slightly oversampled, 
recruiting 201 American participants via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk for $2.00 (participants 
from Study 1 were prevented from participating in Study 2). We decided a priori to exclude all 
participants who failed an instructional manipulation check (n = 7) or who failed to complete all 
dilemmas (n = 3), leaving a final sample of 191 American participants (102 male, 87 female, 2 
other, Mage = 36.87, SD = 10.99, 145 identified as White, 20 as Black, 14 as Hispanic or Latino, 3 
as Pacific Islander, 2 as American Indian or Native American, 6 as other ethnicity, and 1 no 
response).12 
                                                 
12 Analyses controlling for gender employed only participants who identified as male or female.  
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Procedure and materials. First, participants completed the measure of actively open-
minded thinking and the Berlin numeracy task, before completing all measures from Study 1. 
Descriptive statistics such as Cronbach’s alpha for all measures and zero order correlations 
between all measures are reported in Table 2 to facilitate comparisons with existing work as well 
as future meta-analyses. We do not interpret most of these correlations in the present work.  
Actively open-minded thinking. First, participants completed the 7-item Actively Open-
Minded Thinking scale (Haran, Ritov, & Mellers, 2013) by rating their agreement with 
statements such as “People should revise their beliefs in response to new information or 
evidence” on a 7-point scale ranging from Completely disagree to Completely agree. 
Berlin numeracy test. Next, participants completed the 4-item Berlin Numeracy Test 
(Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal, & Garcia-Retamero, 2012). The BNT includes the question, 
“Imagine we are throwing a five-sided die 50 times. On average, out of these 50 throws how 
many times would this five-sided die show an odd number (1, 3 or 5)? (a) 5 out of 50 throws, (b) 
25 out of 50 throws, (c) 30 out of 50 throws, or (d) None of the above.” We summed correct 
responses to these questions for each participant.  
Measures from Study 1. Next, participants also completed all measures from Study 1, 
which again demonstrated adequate reliability: Correct responses on the original CRT, lured 
responses on the original CRT, Correct responses on a new CRT, lured responses on a new CRT, 
correct responses on a new CRT without lures, correct original belief bias questions, correct 
consistent belief bias responses, and correct no-lure belief bias questions, correct responses on 
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other syllogisms, correct responses on verbal reasoning items, and responses to the empathic 
concern section of the IRI.13 
Results and Discussion  
Correlational analysis. First, we computed correlations between all measures of Study 2 
(see Table 2). This analysis revealed that, consistent with Study 1 and past work (e.g., Conway & 
Gawronski, 2013), harm acceptance on conventional sacrificial dilemmas correlated positively 
with the utilitarian PD parameter and negatively with the deontological PD parameter, but the 
parameters themselves were only marginally correlated (r = .14, p = .05). Once again, common 
gender effects replicated: women scored substantially higher on the deontological PD parameter, 
whereas gender differences were negligible on the utilitarian PD parameter (Friesdorf et al., 
2015). However, unlike past work, empathic concern failed to correlate with either parameter (cf. 
Conway & Gawronski, 2013). 
                                                 
13 As in Study 1, the Cronbach’s alpha for some measures was quite low, but this is to be expected for such 
measures, and we again obtained a similar pattern of correlations between third variables and measures with both 
high and low alphas, low alphas make it more difficult to obtain significant correlations, so we retain confidence in 
this pattern of findings despite the limited alphas.  
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Table 2. Correlations between Harm Acceptance on Incongruent and Congruent Dilemmas, the Utilitarian and Deontological Process Dissociation 
Parameters, Actively Open-Minded Thinking, Berlin Numeracy Test, Cognitive Reflection Test, Belief Bias, Syllogisms, Verbal reasoning items, 
Empathic Concern, Gender, and Age in Study 2 (N = 191). 
 α 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.  9.  10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 
1. Harm Acceptance on 
Incongruent Dilemmas 
                   
2. Harm Acceptance on 
Congruent Dilemmas 
- .49***                  
2. Utilitarian PD 
Parameter 
- .51*** -.50***                 
3. Deontological PD 
parameter  
- -.74*** -.89*** .14*                
4. Actively Open-Minded 
Thinking 
.78 .04 -.33*** .36*** .20**               
5. Berlin Numeracy Test .43 -.01 -.19* .18* .13 .31***              
6. Original CRT, Correct .78 .13 -.11 .24** .04 .38*** .33***             
7. Original CRT, Lured  .74 -.12 .08 -.20** -.03 -.35*** -.30*** -.94***            
8. New CRT, Correct .70 .18* -.12 .30*** .05 .37*** .36*** .83*** -.77***           
9. New CRT, Lured  .52 -.14* .05 -.20** .01 -.36*** -.32*** -.78*** .76*** -.79***          
10. New No-Lure CRT, 
Correct 
.83 .14 -.24** .37** .12 .40*** .46*** .50*** -.48*** .63*** -.48***         
11. Original Belief Bias .82 .07 -.25** .32*** .16* .36*** .41*** .47*** -.46*** .47*** -.43*** .61***        
12. No-Lure Belief Bias  .32 -.01 -.44*** .43*** .30*** .40*** .32*** .31*** -.29*** .37*** -.26*** .46*** .48***       
13. Consistent Belief Bias .36 -.09 -.36*** .27*** .27*** .23** .121 .14 -.16* .16* -0.04 .25*** .14 .46***      
14. Other Syllogisms .61 -.03 -.22** .20** .20** .32*** .25** .28*** -.29*** .33*** -.14* .46*** .45*** .35*** .22**     
15. Verbal Reasoning 
Items 
.21 .09 .01 .08 -.08 .20** .15* .32*** -.27*** .25*** -.26*** .20** .16* .18* .04 .10    
16. Empathic Concern .89 -.07 -.09 .02 .05 .07 -.09 -.04 .07 -.13 .13 -.03 -.12 .09 .12 .02 .113   
17. Gender  
(m=1, f=2)  
- -.20** -.16* -.04 .19** -.07 -.06 -.10 .09 -.16* .11 -.15* -.11 -.02 .09 -.05 -.08 .24**  
18. Age - -.05 -.23** .18* .21** .02 -.11 .08 -.07 .06 .02 .09 -.01 .14 .15* .16* -.04 .10 .09 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
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Replicating Baron and colleagues’ (2015) findings, CRT items with lures (Table 2) 
correlated with items without lures. However, the correlations between items with lures were 
often significantly larger than correlations between items with and without lures. For instance, 
correct responses on the original CRT correlated more with correct responses on the new CRT 
(with lures), r = .83, p < 0.001, than with correct responses on the new CRT without lures, r = 
.50, p < .001—a significant difference, z = 6.19, p < .001. This pattern suggests that the presence 
of lures has an impact on CRT responding, though performance on the CRT cannot be attributed 
to overcoming lures alone. Nonetheless, Study 2 replicated Baron and colleagues finding that the 
process of overcoming lures does not seem especially important for dilemma decision-making, 
as we obtained similar patterns between the PD parameters and CRT items both with and without 
lures.  
More importantly, replicating another finding from Study 1, Study 2 found that arithmetic 
items were often more highly correlated with one another than with logical items. For example, 
correct responses on the new CRT (with lures) correlated higher with correct responses on the 
new CRT without lures, r = .63, p < .001 than with correct responses on other syllogisms, r = 
.33, p < .001—a significant difference, z = 3.86, p < .001. This is further evidence that 
performance on arithmetic reasoning items partly measured something that logical reasoning 
items did not—despite some shared variance between these measures.14  
Conventional analyses. More importantly, we replicated the Study 1 finding that some 
measures of arithmetic reflection correlated positively or marginally with harm acceptance on 
conventional sacrificial dilemmas even though others failed to significantly correlate. We also 
                                                 
14 To explore this possibility, we once again conducted factor analysis. This time, the factor structure that emerged 
fit our expectations for a two-factor solution with most arithmetic items loading on one factor, and most logical 
items on the other (see Table S2 in supplement).  
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replicated the Study 1 finding that all logical measures of reflection (e.g., belief bias) failed to 
significantly correlate with conventional sacrificial dilemma judgments. Taken together, these 
results align with past work suggesting an imperfectly reliable link between reflection and harm 
acceptance on conventional sacrificial dilemmas (Baron et al., 2015; Cova et al., 2018). Indeed, 
Baron and colleagues (2015) complained that the correlations between reflection and 
conventional sacrificial dilemma responses were “small and labile” (p. 271), and subject to 
fluctuation across datasets—a common occurrence in the case of suppression (e.g., Reynolds & 
Conway, 2018). To examine this possibility of suppression, we conducted PD analyses.  
Process dissociation analyses. PD analyses clearly replicated Study 1: all arithmetic 
measures (i.e., CRT and BNT) correlated positively with the utilitarian, but not deontological, 
PD parameter. However, logical measures (i.e., belief bias items and other syllogism items) 
correlated positively with both the utilitarian and deontological PD parameters. Thus, consistent 
with Study 1, these findings suggest that arithmetic and logical reflection have distinct 
relationships with dilemma decisions, though these distinct relationships remain largely 
undetected in conventional sacrificial dilemma analyses.  
That is, arithmetic reflection and numeracy correlated only with the utilitarian parameter, 
in line with dual process arguments suggesting that utilitarian judgments are not only more 
reflective, but more influenced by mathematical information. Conversely, logical reflection, 
including performance on belief bias tasks and other syllogisms, correlated with both parameters, 
suggesting that people adept at logic strove to both avoid causing harm and to improve 
outcomes. This finding suggests that some deontological responses may stem from reflection, in 
line with philosophical views of deontological ethics (e.g., Alexander & Moore, 2016; Kant, 
1797/1991) and recent empirical work (e.g., McPhetres et al., 2018). These conclusions from PD 
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analysis conflict with earlier conclusions that the link between reflection and dilemma judgments 
is weak and inconsistent because the early conclusions are based solely on conventional 
incongruent dilemmas that overlook the potential for statistical suppression (e.g., Conway et al., 
2018a, 2018b).  
Mediation analyses. Baron and colleagues (2015) found a correlation between Actively 
Open-minded Thinking, CRT performance (both with and without lures), and dilemma 
judgments. On this basis, they argued that, “People are more likely to adopt [a utilitarian] 
approach if they are actively open-minded thinkers” rather than merely intuition-overriding 
thinkers (p. 279). We did not find a significant correlation between AOT and harm acceptance in 
conventional sacrificial dilemmas. However, we found a significant negative correlation between 
AOT and harm acceptance on congruent dilemmas—a response that goes against both 
deontological and utilitarian considerations. Once that non-deontological and non-utilitarian 
harm acceptance was dissociated from the PD parameters, we found that AOT positively 
correlated not only with the utilitarian parameter, but with the deontological parameter as well 
(i.e., another suppression effect).15 
To clarify why our findings only partially fulfilled Baron and colleagues’ expectations 
about AOT, CRT, and utilitarian judgment, we examined whether actively open-minded 
thinking, numeracy, belief bias, other syllogisms, or verbal reasoning tasks mediated the impact 
of arithmetic reflection on harm acceptance in conventional incongruent dilemmas, and on each 
                                                 
15 Note that the correlation between AOT and the U parameter was marginally stronger than the correlation between 
AOT and the D parameter, z = 1.78, p = .074. This relative difference in size suggests that some samples using this 
measure may obtain complete suppression for conventional sacrificial dilemma judgments, whereas other studies 
may find only partial suppression where the larger effect of AOT and U bleeds into a positive correlation between 
AOT and harm acceptance in conventional incongruent dilemmas, as in Baron and colleagues (2015). Similar 
fluctuation between partial and complete suppression has likewise emerged in related work (e.g., Reynolds & 
Conway, 2018).  
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PD parameter, controlling for age and gender. For each analysis, we employed the PROCESS 
macro in SPSS 22 (IBM Corp., 2013) to conduct three 10,000-iteration simultaneous mediation 
bootstrap analyses according to the procedures recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2004).  
Mediation of CRT on conventional sacrificial dilemma judgments. The first analysis 
examined whether actively open-minded thinking, numeracy, belief bias, other syllogisms, or 
verbal reasoning tasks simultaneously mediated the impact of all correct CRT responses on 
conventional sacrificial dilemma judgments, controlling for age and gender (see Figure 2). There 
was no significant mediation, as all confidence intervals included zero. Consistent with past 
correlational findings (e.g., Paxton, Unger, & Greene 2012), the direct effect of CRT 
performance significantly predicted harm acceptance on conventional incongruent dilemmas, c’ 
= 0.02, SE = .01, CI95 [.004, .028].  
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Figure 2. Only the direct effect from CRT performance to harm acceptance on conventional 
incongruent dilemmas was significant in the mediation analysis, controlling for age and gender. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.  
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Mediation of CRT on utilitarian PD parameter. The second mediation analysis 
examined whether actively open-minded thinking, numeracy, belief bias, other syllogisms, or 
verbal reasoning tasks simultaneously mediated the impact of all correct CRT responses on the 
utilitarian PD parameter, controlling for the deontological PD parameter, age, and gender (see 
Figure 3).16 There was no direct effect, but there were positive indirect effects of CRT 
performance on the utilitarian PD parameter through both actively open-minded thinking, b = 
0.01, SE = 0.002, CI95 [0.004, 0.011] and correct belief bias responses, b = 0.01, SE = 0.004, CI95 
[0.002, 0.018]. We obtained a similar pattern when controlling for the number of lured responses 
participants gave on the CRT.  
These findings partially corroborate Baron and colleagues’ (2015) claim that actively 
open-minded thinking accounts for the link between CRT performance and harm acceptance on 
conventional sacrificial dilemmas. However, belief bias performance also carried significant 
variance from CRT performance to the PD utilitarian parameter. Hence, people scoring higher on 
the CRT may demonstrate increased utilitarian inclinations partially because they engage in more 
actively open-minded thinking—perhaps about otherwise brutal actions—and because they excel 
at overcoming prior beliefs that conflict, logically, with certain moral principles.17   
  
                                                 
16 We obtain similar findings without including covariates. Due to the covariates, these analyses provide results 
similar to those produced by structural equation modelling examining both parameters simultaneously (Hayes, 
Montoya, & Rockwood, 2017). 
17 Note that the correlation between logical measures of reflection and the U parameter were reliably larger than the 
correlation between the same measures of reflection and the D parameter. However, these differences were not 
reliably significant, 1.1 < zs < 2.02, .02 < ps < .14 (Study 1) and 0 < zs < 1.65, .049 < ps < .5 (Study 2). 
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Figure 3. Increased actively open-minded thinking and performance on belief bias tasks 
mediated the effect of CRT performance on the utilitarian PD parameter, controlling for the 
deontological PD parameter, age, and gender. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.  
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Mediation of CRT on deontological PD parameter. The third mediation analysis 
examined whether actively open-minded thinking, numeracy, belief bias, other syllogisms, or 
verbal reasoning tasks simultaneously mediated the impact of all correct CRT responses on the 
deontological PD parameter, controlling for the utilitarian PD parameter, age, and gender (see 
Figure 4). Again, there was no significant direct effect, but there were significant indirect effects 
of CRT performance on the deontological PD parameter through both actively open-minded 
thinking, b = 0.003, SE = 0.002, CI95 [0.0001, 0.008] and correct belief bias responses, b = 0.009, 
SE = 0.004, CI95 [0.003, 0.02]. We obtained the same mediation pattern when controlling for the 
number of lured responses participants gave on the CRT.  
These findings contrast with Baron and colleagues’ (2015) claims, as they demonstrate 
that actively open-minded thinking and overcoming belief bias not only mediate variance from 
CRT performance on increases in utilitarian responding, but also mediate increases in 
deontological responding. That is, people scoring higher on the CRT may demonstrate increased 
deontological inclinations partially because they engage in more creative open-minded 
consideration of brutal utilitarian actions, and because they excel at overcoming prior beliefs 
with logic. Hence, this pattern confirms that some cognitive deliberation contributes to 
deontological responding, a finding difficult to detect without use of process dissociation. Note 
that this analysis does not rule out the role of affective or emotional processes contributing to 
deontological responses; considerable other work documents important contributions from such 
processes (e.g., Reynolds & Conway, 2018; Szekeley, Opre, & Miu, 2015). But these findings 
align with other work indicating that cognitive deliberation plays a previously underappreciated 
role in deontological responding (e.g., McPhetres et al., 2018).   
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Figure 4. Increased actively open-minded thinking and performance on belief bias tasks 
mediated the effect of CRT performance on the deontological PD parameter, controlling for the 
utilitarian PD parameter, age, and gender. † p = 0.08, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.  
 
  
 Arithmetic 
Reflection: CRT 
Performance 
Actively Open-minded Thinking 
ab = .003, SE = .002, CI95 = [.0001, .008] 
Belief Bias Questions 
ab = .009, SE = .004, CI95 = [.003, .02] 
Deontological PD 
Parameter 
REFLECTION AND DILEMMA JUDGMENT  43 
General Discussion 
In two studies, we clarified past work examining the association between reflection and 
sacrificial dilemma judgments. We replicated the finding that measures of reflection correlated 
with accepting harm in conventional sacrificial dilemmas, though consistent with past work these 
findings were sometimes labile (e.g., Baron et al., 2015; Moore et al., 2008; Paxton et al., 2012; 
Cova et al., 2018). Moreover, these findings suggested that the general category of ‘reflection’ 
might capture at least two distinct thinking styles. Arithmetic reflection, such as performance on 
the CRT, appears to capture the tendency to comprehend and process mathematical information 
that is incongruent with intuitively appealing lures. Logical reflection, such as performance on 
belief bias items, appears to capture the tendency to comprehend and process logical structure 
despite incongruent prior beliefs. Arithmetic reflection predicted conventional sacrificial 
dilemma judgment more clearly and robustly than did measures of logical reflection. Therefore, 
interpretations based on only conventional sacrificial dilemmas alone might conclude that 
mathematical but not logical reflection contributes to dilemma judgments.  
However, we also employed process dissociation to reveal a more nuanced pattern of 
findings by assessing deontological and utilitarian response tendencies independently of one 
another and of other response tendencies. This analysis revealed that measures of arithmetic 
reflection correlated positively and robustly with utilitarian but not deontological response 
tendencies, consistent with dual process claims suggesting that reflection contributes more to 
utilitarian than deontological decision-making (e.g., Greene, 2013). This finding also dispelled 
concerns about possibly weak or labile connections between reflection and dilemma judgments 
when measured using techniques more sensitive than conventional methods. Moreover, this 
analysis revealed that logical measures of reflection were uniquely related to increases in both 
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deontological and utilitarian response tendencies—dual relationships that largely cancelled out, 
leading to null effects on conventional sacrificial dilemmas, as in past work (e.g., Conway et al., 
2018a; Reynolds & Conway, 2018). Not only does this finding demonstrate the enhanced 
sensitivity of process dissociation to detect otherwise undetected effects, but it also accords with 
a growing body of work demonstrating that some kinds of reflection contribute to deontological 
decisions (e.g., Gamez-Djokic & Molden, 2017; Körner & Volk, 2014; McPhetres et al., 2018). 
Moreover, we found none of five mediator candidates, including actively open-minded 
thinking or performance on other reflection tasks mediated the direct effect of CRT performance 
on harm accepting responses to conventional sacrificial dilemmas. This finding contrasts 
somewhat with Baron and colleagues (2015), who suggested that actively open-minded thinking 
explains the relationship between CRT performance and harm acceptance in conventional 
sacrificial dilemmas. However, mediation using PD revealed that actively open-minded thinking, 
as well as performance on belief bias tasks (a measure of logical reflection) each mediated 
unique variance CRT performance on increases in both the deontology and utilitarian 
parameters. Again, these dual positive mediation relationships suppress one another, cancelling 
out for conventional sacrificial dilemma judgments. Hence, although correlational analyses 
demonstrate that CRT performance on other measures of arithmetic reflection predict increases 
in utilitarian but not deontological responses directly, to the degree that such measures share 
variance with measures of logical reasoning, they indirectly predict increases in both response 
tendencies. Hence, the role of reflection in moral decision-making is more complex than 
previously realized, and techniques such as process dissociation are required to clarify this 
complexity.  
Theoretical Implications 
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 Reflection & Dilemma Judgment. These findings clarify a number of important 
theoretical issues. First, they provide the first demonstration of which we are aware that multiple 
categorically different types of reflection contribute to dilemma decision-making in different 
ways. Specifically, arithmetic reflection, such as CRT performance (on all variants, whether 
original or novel, whether lured or without lures), avoidance of CRT lured answers, and 
performance on the Berlin numeracy task, all predicted increases in utilitarian but not 
deontological responding, in line with dual process claims. In other words, more numerate 
individuals may be more influenced by the arithmetic features of dilemmas (Reyna et al., 2009) 
than other individuals.  
 However, non-arithmetic measures of reflection, such as belief bias tests, syllogisms, and 
actively open-minded thinking items, predicted increases in both the utilitarian and deontological 
parameters. Thus, arithmetic reflection might be related to dilemma judgments in a way that 
logical reflection is not. So theorists might benefit from considering such differences rather than 
pooling all measures of reflection when analyzing the relationship between reflection and 
dilemma judgments.  
 Dual process model. Second, these findings partially support and partially contradict the 
dual process model claim that cognitive deliberation contributes more to utilitarian than to 
deontological judgments (e.g., Greene, 2013). Findings examining mathematical reflection 
appear to largely corroborate this distinction, given their robust association with the utilitarian 
but not deontological parameter. However, the findings assessing logical reflection clearly 
indicate that reflection can and does contribute to deontological dilemma decisions, 
corroborating a growing body of work that also finds an impact of deliberation on deontological 
decisions (e.g., McPhetres et al., 2018).  
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Therefore, these findings suggest revisions to the dual process model: both utilitarian and 
deontological judgment may arise via reflection, but utilitarian judgment may be more 
influenced by “moral calculations” than deontological judgments (Greene et al., 2004, italics 
added). In other words, people who make utilitarian decisions may be more likely than others to 
incorporate calculations about predicted outcomes into ethical decisions. In line with this 
possibility, Patil and colleagues (2019) recently demonstrated that performance on the Daw two-
step task uniquely correlates with the utilitarian, but not the deontological parameter. This 
sequential decision task distinguishes computationally-demanding model-based evaluations 
based on calculations about consequences from reflexive model-free evaluations based solely on 
past habituation (Daw, Gershman, Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 2011; Kool, Cushman, & 
Gershman, 2016). Previous theorizing has linked utilitarian dilemma responses to model-based 
decision-making and deontological dilemma responses to model-free decision-making (Crockett, 
2013; Cushman, 2013); the present findings are consistent with this theory. However, the current 
findings also suggest that people who tend to engage in certain kinds of reflection score high on 
both PD dilemma parameters; further research could examine how model-free vs model-based 
accounts of decision can incorporate this insight.  
How to best interpret the difference between dilemma response patterns is the subject of 
ongoing investigation. For instance, future work might further clarify the content of reflection 
when people arrive at deontological decisions: it is possible people are reflecting on whether 
actions accord with universal moral norms, or could be justified as universal maxims, as 
suggested by classic deontological theory (Kant, 1797/1991). Yet, this finding may also involve 
reflecting on abstract moral rules (Körner & Volk, 2014; Lammers & Stapel, 2009), avoidance of 
violations in general (Gamez-Djokic & Molden, 2017); concern for adhering to Divine 
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Commands (Piazza & Landy, 2013); adhering to religious values (McPhetres et al., 2018); 
strategically presenting oneself as warm, moral, and trustworthy (e.g., Rom & Conway, 2018; 
Everett, Ingbretsen, Cushman, & Cikara, 2017; Bostyn & Roets, 2018), or perhaps a mixture of 
any and all of the above.  
Existing research suggests a few mechanisms of deontological dilemma judgments that 
involve reflection. First, reflection can promote a more abstract conception of the self (e.g., 
Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002), and abstract mindsets can promote deontological 
judgments in conditions when reflection is not inhibited (Körner & Volk, 2014; Lammers & 
Stapel, 2009). Second, religious reflection in particular might promote or select for abstract, 
deontological moral reasoning (McPhetres et al., 2018). For instance, divine command theory 
forbids harming others, thereby aligning with the deontological dilemma response (Piazza & 
Landy, 2013) and religious values help guide dilemma decisions (Piazza & Sousa, 2014; 
Szekely, Opre & Miu, 2015). Relatedly, religious individuals tend to incorporate religion into 
their self-concept (Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). So if reflection can promote a more 
abstract conception of the self (e.g., Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002) and if an abstract 
mindset is associated with deontological judgments in conditions when reflection is not inhibited 
(e.g., Körner & Volk, 2014), then more reflective religious individuals will reason more 
abstractly and thereby find themselves preferring more deontological judgments (Piazza & 
Landy, 2013; Piazza & Sousa, 2014; Reynolds & Conway 2018). Of course, each of these 
mechanisms may operate independently of the others.  
Note that none of these findings rules out the possibility that other non-reflective 
processes also independently contribute to deontological decisions, such as heuristic adherence 
to moral rules (Sunstein, 2005; Nichols & Mallon, 2006), or affective reactions to causing or 
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witnessing harm (e.g., Miller et al., 2014; Reynolds & Conway, 2018; Szekely, Opre & Miu, 
2015). Hence, theorists should avoid simplistically associating reflection with only utilitarian 
judgments, and non-reflective processing with only deontological judgments, as clearly there is 
more complexity than previously appreciated. That said, these findings align with a great deal of 
work suggesting the basic dual process claim that cognitive processes play a relatively greater 
role in driving utilitarian than deontological judgments (e.g., Conway et al., 2018a).  
One might think that these findings challenge the standard dual-process model of 
deontological dilemma judgments. After all, the standard dual-process model proposes that 
deontological dilemma judgments are primarily driven by emotional responses and involve 
reflection only to rationalize these emotional responses (Greene, 2008). Whereas our findings 
confirm that deontological dilemma judgments are compatible with certain types of reflective 
reasoning, our findings do not rule out that emotional responses also contribute to deontological 
responding. Surprisingly, empathic concern failed to correlate with deontological inclinations in 
the present studies, which may appear to undermine the argument for a contribution of emotion. 
However, we interpret this null effect with extreme caution, as it contrasts with the vast majority 
of findings on this topic (e.g., Conway et al., 2018a; Conway & Gawronksi, 2013; Reynolds & 
Conway, 2018; Szekely, Opre & Miu, 2015).  
 Methodological implications. Conventional sacrificial dilemmas can be less sensitive 
than process dissociation dilemmas and related analyses. Conventional sacrificial dilemma 
analyses suggest that harm acceptance sometimes correlates with AOT (Baron et al., 2015) and 
CRT (Paxton, Ungar, & Greene, 2012; Baron et al., 2015; Byrd 2019; Cova et al., 2018). Yet, 
dissociating deontological and utilitarian tendencies from other non-deontological and non-
utilitarian tendencies via PD has clarified these results in two ways. First, PD has revealed that 
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both deontological and utilitarian tendencies correlate with AOT. Second, PD has revealed that 
AOT and logical reflection mediated the correlation between dilemma judgments and arithmetic 
measures of reflection like CRTs. These findings suggest that actively open-minded thinking 
may be another measure whose suppressed correlation with harm acceptance on conventional 
sacrificial dilemmas can be clarified through PD (see Conway et al., 2018a, 2018b; Hayakawa, 
Tannenbaum, Costa, Corey, & Keysar, 2017; Miller, Hannikainen, & Cushman 2014; Muda, 
Niszczota, Białek, & Conway, 2018; Reynolds & Conway, 2018). Hence, researchers should 
exert caution when employing analyses that assume that correlates of one horn of sacrificial 
dilemmas must be anti-correlates or non-correlates of the other horn of the dilemmas. PD 
repeatedly shows that what correlates positively with one horn of a sacrificial dilemma 
sometimes correlates positively with the other horn as well. 
 The use of PD enables researchers to distinguish between people who accept causing 
harm with the goal of maximizing outcomes from people who simply accept causing harm 
regardless of outcomes—a tendency that is inconsistent with both deontological and utilitarian 
ethics. For example, psychopathy correlates positively with harm acceptance judgments in 
conventional sacrificial dilemmas (e.g., Bartels & Pizarro, 2011), similar to performance on the 
CRT. However, PD reveals different underlying interpretations for these apparently parallel 
effects: greater psychopathy predicts accepting harm indiscriminately (e.g., Reynolds & Conway, 
2019), whereas greater reflection predicts accepting harm only if it maximizes outcomes. 
Moreover, unlike conventional analyses of sacrificial dilemmas that assess only how factors 
influence the relative strength of response tendencies, PD can reveal cases where a factor 
predicts increases in both response tendencies simultaneously—a pattern that cancels out for 
conventional dilemmas, which pit these response tendencies against one another. In this manner, 
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PD revealed that open-minded and logical reflection predicted both utilitarian and deontological 
response patterns, suggesting that more open-minded and reflective people are more averse to 
causing harm indiscriminately.  
It is important to note that the innovation of PD goes beyond its addition of congruent 
dilemmas to conventional incongruent dilemmas. PD provides more information than merely 
examining the raw correlations between each dilemma type and third variables because the PD 
parameters track variance in the pattern of responding across both types of scenarios. Hence, the 
U parameter tracks individual differences in both accepting harm on incongruent dilemmas and 
rejecting harm on congruent dilemmas (Figure 1), which is more informative than individual 
differences to each kind of dilemma in isolation.  
Implications for philosophy. Historians of philosophy might not be surprised that some 
measures of reflection correlated with deontological inclinations. Indeed, famous conceptions of 
deontology describe such judgments as arising from reflection about the logical implications of 
universal moral norms (e.g., Kant, 1797/1991). Early dilemma research highlighted the 
intriguing inconsistency between the rational cognitive deliberation professed by deontological 
philosophers and the apparent absence of such deliberation lay deontological judgments (e.g., 
Greene et al., 2004). The current work suggests that this inconsistency may have been 
overstated—clearly reflection can contribute to deontological dilemma decision-making even if 
utilitarian responses may be more influenced by arithmetic reflection than deontological 
responses. After all, practicing philosophers tend to score particularly high on measures of 
reflective processing (Livengood, Sytsma, Feltz, Scheines, & Machery, 2010; Byrd, 2019), and 
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many philosophers endorse both deontological metaethics and deontological dilemma judgments 
(e.g., Conway et al., 2018a).18  
However, these data do not merely confirm historical precedent; they also bear on 
contemporary philosophy. With the rise of the dual process model, some theorists appealed to 
findings linking utilitarian judgments to reflection suggesting that utilitarian judgments may be 
normatively superior to deontological judgments—the idea being that the utilitarian approach 
overcomes biases introduced by less reflective, affective, or heuristic processes theorized to drive 
deontological judgments (e.g., Baron, 1994; Greene, 2015; Bazerman & Greene, 2010; cf. 
Bennis et al., 2010). However, the present data undermine this normative argument for the 
utilitarian approach. They suggest that some deontological judgments arise from the kind of 
cognitive reflection that can overcome biases. Therefore, by the dual process theorists’ own 
lights, the present findings suggest that the normative value of deontological considerations is 
higher than what some dual process theorists have argued (e.g., Bennis, et al., 2010). Granted, 
the current evidence suggest that mathematical reflection contributes to utilitarian judgments 
more than deontological judgments. Hence, the broad dual process claim that utilitarian 
judgments involve more reflection than deontological judgments could be partially correct. 
Either way, the current findings undermine existing normative claims about the deontological 
and utilitarian approaches based on differences in reflection and suggest that theorists should 
look elsewhere for evidence to supports such normative claims.  
Limitations  
                                                 
18 That said, some evidence employing conventional incongruent dilemmas suggests that more reflective 
philosophers tend to prefer utilitarian over deontological judgments in sacrificial dilemmas (Byrd, 2019). 
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Like all dilemma research, this work suffers from the limitation that it examines 
responses to hypothetical scenarios, and therefore runs the risk that it may track somewhat 
different psychological processes than those of real-world decisions. Indeed, some work finds 
only null or weak correlations between hypothetical and real-world dilemma decisions (Bostyn, 
Sevenhant, & Roets, 2018; cf. Plunkett & Greene, 2019), though such studies examine only 
conventional sacrificial dilemma decisions, and hence may suffer from the same suppression 
problems as other work in the field. Moreover, decisions on moral dilemmas appear to track 
some real-world decisions (e.g., Dickinson & Masclet, 2018). Moreover, though dilemmas may 
be somewhat artificial, they have proven useful at shedding light on a swath of related literatures 
from neuroscience to hormone studies to decisions about autonomous vehicles (e.g., Greene, 
2014; Bonnefon, Shariff, & Rahwan, 2016), and hence remain a worthy target of study despite 
this limitation.  
Second, some theorists have argued that most sacrificial dilemma research is limited by a 
confound between action and decision: the deontological response pattern entails inaction, 
whereas the utilitarian response pattern often entails action (e.g., Gawronski & Beer, 2017). 
Hence, these theorists developed a new model, similar to PD, but with three parameters, called 
the CNI model (Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf, & Hütter, 2017). This model 
estimates the focus on consequences, or the C parameter, analogous to the U parameter in the 
current work, and two more parameters theorized to be confounded in the current work: the N 
parameter tracking a tendency to consistently prioritize the wellbeing of a single individual over 
the wellbeing of a group, and the I parameter tracking a tendency to remain inactive in the face 
of moral problems. Given the similarity between the PD and CNI method, one might expect to 
find similar correlation patterns between each model’s parameters and various measures of 
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reflection. Yet, initial CNI work suggests that reflection may predict different correlations in the 
PD model than the CNI, perhaps lower I parameter scores (Gawronski et al., 2017). So the PD 
and CNI models may not be as similar as they seem at first glance. Further, while the CNI 
model’s N parameter tracks consistency across both prescriptive and proscriptive moral norms, 
both deontological theorists (Alexander & Moore, 2016; Kant, 1785/1959) and lay people 
(Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009) treat proscriptive and prescriptive norms differently. Many 
deontological philosophers think that proscriptive duties are perfect—e.g., we should never be 
stealing (e.g., Kant, 1785/1959). However, such deontologists admit that prescriptive duties are 
imperfect—e.g., generally, we should give to charity, but we need not always be giving to 
charity (ibid.). Further, this prescriptive-proscriptive asymmetry is rejected by utilitarian 
philosophers (e.g., Singer, 1972). So although we agree with the CNI model’s claim that both 
moral norms and preferences for inaction play a role in dilemma responses, we and other 
theorists remain open to the idea that combining these two features according to the PD model 
may not confound our interpretation of dilemma response patterns, but rather accurately express 
their features (e.g., Baron, 1994; Cushman, Knobe, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008). Thus, it is not 
obvious how arithmetic and logical reflection would predict the CNI parameters after all. Future 
work might profitably examine this possibility.  
Conclusion 
The present studies partially replicate, but also clarify the relationships between reflection 
and moral dilemma judgments: arithmetic reflection predicted utilitarian but not deontological 
response patterns, whereas logical reflection predicted both deontological and utilitarian 
response patterns, and these dual positive effects largely cancelled out in conventional sacrificial 
dilemma judgments that treat them as opposites. Moreover, actively open-minded thinking and 
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belief bias performance mediated the impact of arithmetic reflection on both utilitarian and 
deontological and utilitarian tendencies. Thus, different kinds of reflection may contribute to 
dilemma judgments in different ways, but these relationships are more complex and nuanced 
than recognized in previous work.  
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Appendix – Process Dissociation Calculations for Moral Dilemma Judgments 
Calculating the deontology and utilitarian PD parameters requires examining responses to 
both congruent and incongruent dilemmas. Utilitarianism entails maximizing overall outcomes, 
whereas deontology entails avoiding causing harm regardless of outcomes. Harmful action 
maximizes overall outcomes in the incongruent, but not congruent, dilemmas. Therefore, 
utilitarianism and deontology lead to different response patterns across dilemma variants. 
Consider the processing tree depicted in Figure 1: The top path illustrates the case where 
utilitarianism drives the response to a dilemma, which entails rejecting harm for congruent 
dilemmas but accepting harm for incongruent dilemmas. The second path illustrates the case 
where deontology drives the response to a dilemma, which entails rejecting harm for both 
congruent and incongruent dilemmas. Finally, the bottom path represents the case where neither 
utilitarianism nor deontology drives the response to a dilemma; this case entails accepting harm 
for both congruent and incongruent dilemmas.  
Using the two columns on the right side of the figure, it is possible to work backward to 
determine which cases led participants to judge harm as acceptable or unacceptable for both 
congruent and incongruent dilemmas. For congruent dilemmas, harm is unacceptable when 
either utilitarianism drives the response, U, or when deontology drives the response, (1 – U) × D. 
Conversely, harm is acceptable on congruent dilemmas when neither utilitarianism nor 
deontology drives the response, (1 – U) × (1 – D). For incongruent dilemmas, harm is 
unacceptable when deontology drives the response, (1 – U) × D. Conversely, harm is acceptable 
either when utilitarianism drives the response, U, or when neither utilitarianism nor deontology 
drives the response, (1 – U) × (1 – D).  
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By combining these cases, it becomes possible to algebraically represent the probability 
of a particular judgment. For example, the probability of judging harm as unacceptable for 
congruent dilemmas is represented by the case where either utilitarianism drives responses or 
deontology drives responses:  
Eq. (A.1) p(unacceptable | congruent)=U + [(1 – U) × D] 
Conversely, the probability of judging harm as acceptable in congruent dilemmas is 
represented by the case that neither utilitarianism nor deontology drives responses: 
Eq. (A.2) p(acceptable | congruent)=(1 – U) × (1 – D) 
For incongruent dilemmas, the probability of judging harm as unacceptable is represented 
by the case that deontology drives responses:  
Eq. (A.3) p(unacceptable | incongruent)=(1 – U) × D 
Conversely, the probability of judging harm as acceptable for incongruent dilemmas is 
represented by the cases that utilitarianism drives responses, or neither deontology nor 
utilitarianism drives responses:  
Eq. (A.4) p(acceptable | incongruent)=U + [(1 – U) × (1 – D)] 
Once the probabilities of accepting and rejecting harm in congruent and incongruent 
dilemmas are represented algebraically, it becomes possible to enter a participants’ pattern of 
actual responses across multiple congruent and incongruent dilemmas, and algebraically 
combine these equations in order to solve for two parameters estimating deontological (D) and 
utilitarian (U) inclinations underpinning their responses. In particular, by including Equation 3 
into Equation 1, the latter can be solved for U, leading to the following formula: 
Eq. (A.5) U=p(unacceptable | congruent) - p(unacceptable | incongruent) 
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Moreover, by including the calculated value for U in Equation 3, this equation can be 
solved for D, leading to the following formula:  
Eq. (A.6) D=p(unacceptable | incongruent) / (1 – U) 
Together, these formulas enable researchers to obtain parameters that independently 
estimate the strength of deontological and utilitarian inclinations underlying conventional 
sacrificial moral dilemma judgments and dissociate these inclinations from other, non-
deontological, and non-utilitarian inclinations. 
This method could be called the ‘U-first' method since it starts with the U parameter, 
making U the “dominant process” and then derives the D parameter, making D the “nondominant 
process” (Klauer et al., 2015). However, dilemma response parameters can also be assessed with 
the reverse, 'D-first' method, by starting with the D parameter and then deriving the U parameter. 
Past work repeatedly found that both the U-first and D-first methods produce nearly identical 
results (e.g., Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Appendix B; Conway et al., 2018b, Footnote 2). 
Hence, despite valid concerns about the invariance assumption of process dissociation in general 
(Klauer et al., 2015), various applications of process dissociation to moral dilemmas suggests 
that the invariance assumption turns out to be unproblematic for PD dilemma analysis. 
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Supplement A – Data Archiving 
All data files and SPSS analysis syntax are available from the Open Science Framework: 
https://osf.io/y4mdw/ 
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Supplement B – Study 1, Factor Analysis 
The results of Study 1 suggested that the various measures of reflection employed by 
Baron and colleagues can be divided into at least two conceptually different types of reflection: 
arithmetic and logical, on the basis of the findings that these measures demonstrate quite 
different patterns in terms of predicting dilemma judgments. Yet, the question remains whether a 
factor analysis would reveal a similar distinction in terms of the variance of responses to these 
measures. Thus, we conducted an exploratory principle components analysis19 with oblimin 
rotation on all measures of reflection (i.e., all variants of the CRT, all variants of belief bias, 
other syllogism items, and verbal reasoning items, but we did not include measures of lured 
responses to avoid redundancy). This analysis revealed three factors with eigenvalues greater 
than 1 (3.65, 1.13, and 1.04) that together accounted for 72.65% of the variance (Table S1). Five 
items loaded above .4 on the first factor, which appeared to represent a combination of 
mathematical and logical reasoning: original belief bias, other logical reasoning, New CRT 
without Lure Performance, Original CRT performance, and New CRT with Lures Performance 
(see Table 2). Three items loaded above .4 on the second factor, most of which involve lures and 
mathematical reasoning: Original CRT performance, New CRT with Lure Performance, and 
other logical reasoning. Two items loaded above .4 on the third factor, both of which involve 
logical reasoning: no-lure belief bias and consistent belief bias. This suggests that some measures 
of reflection capture more arithmetic reflection while other measures of reflection capture more 
logical reflection, even though most items appear to share a common degree of variance (first 
factor) suggestive of some general component of reflection. This interpretation is largely 
                                                 
19 A principle axis factor analysis produced very similar results.  
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consistent with past factor analyses finding that arithmetic measures of reflection loaded 
different factors than logical measures of reflection (Baron et al. 2015, figure 3).  
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Table S1. The pattern matrix derived from a principle components analysis with oblimin rotation 
revealed three factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, suggesting that factors corresponding to 
general reflection, avoidance of lured responses on mostly arithmetic items, and logical 
reflection, though not all factor loadings emerged as one would expect in Study 1.  
 Factor 
 1 2 3 
Original CRT, Correct Responses .476 -.678 -.199 
New CRT, Correct Responses .519 -.572 .095 
New No Lure CRT, Correct Responses .642 -.151 .209 
Original Belief Bias .794 -.048 -.038 
No-lure Belief Bias .267 .107 .776 
Consistent Belief Bias -.113 -.118 .904 
Other Syllogisms .790 -.048 -.038 
Verbal Reasoning Items -.191 -.860 -.117 
Note: Rotation converged in 10 iterations. 
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Supplement C – Study 2, Factor Analysis 
In order to see if arithmetic and logical reflection items loaded onto a single factor or 
onto different factors, we conducted an exploratory principle components analysis20 with oblimin 
rotation on all of the measures of reflection (i.e., all CRT measures, belief bias measures, 
syllogism, and verbal reasoning items, Berlin Numeracy test, and AOT, but no measures of lured 
responses). This analysis revealed two factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 (3.56 and 1.20) 
that together accounted for 59.50% of the variance. Six items loaded above .4 on the first factor, 
most of which involve arithmetic: numeracy, Original CRT performance, New CRT with Lures 
Performance, New CRT without Lure Performance, original belief bias, and verbal reasoning 
items (see Table S2). Four items loaded above .4 on the second factor, most of which involve 
syllogisms: AOT, no-lure belief bias, consistent belief bias, and other logical reasoning. This 
suggests that some measures of reflection capture more arithmetic reflection while other 
measures of reflection capture more logical reflection (although this was not a perfect 
distinction). Again, this interpretation is largely consistent with past factor analyses finding that 
arithmetic measures of reflection loaded a different factor than logical measures of reflection 
(Baron et al. 2015, figure 3).  
                                                 
20 A principle axis factor analysis produced very similar results.  
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Table S2. The pattern matrix derived from a principle components analysis with oblimin rotation 
revealed two factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, suggesting factors corresponding mostly to 
arithmetic reflection and mostly to logical reflection, though not all factor loadings emerged as 
one would expect in Study 2.  
 Factor 
 1 2 
Actively Open-Minded Thinking .355 .414 
Berlin Numeracy Test .456 .244 
Original CRT, Correct Responses .876 -.035 
New CRT, Correct Responses .850 .051 
New No Lure CRT, Correct Responses .593 .394 
Original Belief Bias .531 .379 
No-lure Belief Bias .136 .748 
Consistent Belief Bias -.257 .823 
Other Syllogisms .223 .535 
Verbal Reasoning Items .552 -.185 
Note: Rotation converged in 18 iterations. 
 
 
